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The paper tackles the implications of the system of corporate governance on the level and prevalent 
modes of innovation activities and ways in which innovations are developed, financed and implemented with-
in enterprises. The paper aims to contribute to the discussions on corporate governance and innovation by 
explaining the interrelationship between institutional conditions, corporate strategies related to innovation, 
and innovation activities, and by applying the framework to Croatia, as a (post-)transition country with a 
specific developmental pattern. However, the current debate about the effects of basic systems of corporate 
governance (Anglo-American and continental European) in relation to innovative activities cannot be ad-
equately applied to (post-)transition countries. In Croatia, despite regulatory and capital market-related im-
provements in the last decade, the system of corporate governance is still relatively underdeveloped; as such, 
it is insufficiently conducive to innovation. The effectiveness of a national innovation system is reflected in the 
complexity of innovative activities within firms and their effects on competitiveness of firms and sectors. The 
corporate governance system currently seems inadequate for development of a knowledge-based economy, 
because it primarily supports non-complex innovation activities. This is reflected in the marginalization of 
innovation within corporate strategies, which lead to their low economic effects. The lack of cooperative 
stakeholder relationships precludes risk sharing that could facilitate innovation projects with higher value 
added. This can partly be addressed by external investments (accompanied by technological and managerial 
improvements) into greenfield projects and established companies – especially innovative small and medium-
sized enterprises with a high growth potential.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Competitiveness in markets where high added value is created is related to innovativeness. 
The innovation of products and processes provides a paramount contribution to the restructuring of 
industrial structure of particular sectors and the economy as a whole. Understanding the determi-
nants of innovation performance requires tackling both the market and wider institutional factors 
that influence the level and characteristics of innovation within an economy. These determinants 
are often analyzed in terms of national innovative capacity, i.e. the ability of a country to produce 
and commercialise a long-term flow of innovative technology (cf. Stern, Porter and Furman, 2000), 
which involves R&D supply, absorption capacity, diffusion of knowledge and market demand (cf. 
Radošević, 2004). However, innovative activities occur within socio-economic systems1, and it can 
be expected that wider institutional factors may strongly affect it. The capacity to innovate depends 
1 Socio-economic systems can be said to consist of three basic subsystems: institutions, technological 
regime and economic subsystem (cf. Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988). Although they are interlinked, a demarcation 
line between them can be outlined. Institutions are “durable systems of established and embedded social 
rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2004:3). Technology regimes can best be understood as 
prevailing technology systems, practices and policies. Economic subsystem comprises firms and markets for 
capital, labour and products/services.
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upon the national innovation system, which entails actors, relationships and interactions among 
actors that influence creation, diffusion, utilisation and commercialization of knowledge within a 
country – with the emphasis on research institutions, business sector and government (cf. Kuhl-
mann, 2001; Lundvall, 1992, 2006). Furthermore, innovation evolves within particular institutional 
environments and systems of corporate governance, which regulate business activities and influence 
the creation and utilization of new knowledge, as well as the financing of innovation.
The main focus of the paper is the relationship between the system of corporate governance 
and innovation activities in Croatia. Račić and Aralica (2006) emphasized in their recent paper the 
relationship between the institutional environment, market efficiencies and corporate competencies 
and stressed the importance of interaction between the national innovation system and the corporate 
governance system for competitiveness and innovation within the economy. In this paper we take a 
step forward and further analyze the implications of the system of corporate governance on the level 
and prevalent modes of innovation activities and ways in which innovations are developed, financed 
and implemented within enterprises. Hereby the system of corporate governance and the national in-
novation system are viewed in terms of “institutional complementarity” (cf. Amable, 2000), i.e. they 
are functionally interrelated and their respective institutions are expected to co-evolve depending on 
environmental demands and internal structures and relationships.
Several authors have attempted to explain industrial specialization of particular countries com-
paring corporate governance systems (and/or institutional frameworks in general) and innovation 
performance. Visintin (2001) outlined Italian industrial specialization in terms of innovation activi-
ties and noticed some possible directions for its change in view of the changing corporate govern-
ance system. Tylecote and Ramirez (2005) have explained technological innovation activities of the 
UK companies using a well-developed characterization of the country's corporate governance and 
financial system. Furthermore, Casper and Matraves (2003) analyzed how governance structures 
impact the innovation capabilities of leading German and UK firms in the pharmaceutical industry, 
showing how variations in national institutional frameworks influence the innovation process and 
relative performance.
This exploratory paper aims to contribute to the discussions on corporate governance and in-
novation by explaining the interrelationship between institutional conditions, corporate strategies 
related to innovation, and innovation activities. Furthermore, this framework is applied to Croatia, 
as a (post-)transition country with a specific developmental pattern. We have structured the paper 
in three main parts that follow the introduction. The second section is devoted to the literature 
overview, after which a case-study of Croatia is presented in the third section. The latter discusses 
corporate governance and innovation activities in Croatia, and is broken down into further parts, 
which deal with the system of corporate governance, innovation strategies and performance and 
corporate governance and external financing of innovation, respectively. The final summarizes the 
main findings and offers some concluding remarks.
2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
By corporate governance we mean “a set of relationships between a company's management, 
its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders” (OECD, 2004). Corporate governance is influ-
enced by the firm's external and internal conditions. External factors comprise government and stock 
exchange regulation, national corporate governance code (if it exists) and the structure of relevant 
markets for capital, labour and products/services. Relevant internal conditions include ownership 
structure, internal organization (especially the systems of decision-making and control and organi-
zational culture), and power relationships among different stakeholders. Corporate governance in 
practice revolves around the definition of strategic objectives, means to fulfil them and instruments 
to measure fulfilment of these objectives, as well as around defining rights and relationships be-
tween main stakeholders concerning control, income flow, assets and liabilities, and information of 
the enterprise (cf. Mygind, 2001).
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The emergence of knowledge-based economy complicates both value creation and risk man-
agement. Lazonick and O'Sullivan (1998) argue that, given organizational control over the strategic 
allocation of resources and returns, learning and innovation within enterprises is enabled by finan-
cial commitment (access to the financial resources until financial returns from innovation can be 
reaped) and organizational integration whereby stakeholders have the necessary incentives to jointly 
contribute their skills and efforts in the pursuit of common goals. At the societal level, corporate 
governance can be viewed as a learning process that operates through interaction among various 
stakeholders and results in particular social habits and institutions. Its effectiveness can be analyzed 
in terms of processes (e.g. levels of transparency and accountability of managers and firms to their 
stakeholders) and (economic, social and environmental) outcomes. Effective governance requires a 
balancing process between the macro-level wider institutional frameworks, meso-level opportuni-
ties for stakeholder interaction and micro-level managerial autonomy and accountability (Račić and 
Podrug, 2004).
Given this embeddedness of governance arrangements into institutional frameworks and so-
cietal habits, there are various national systems of corporate governance. Despite emerging initia-
tives towards international standards (cf. OECD, 2004) and the harmonization pressures induced by 
globalization of financial markets and business operations, many differences are still likely to be 
preserved. This includes the basic distinction between Anglo-American (USA and UK) and conti-
nental European and East Asian governance systems, i.e. between “shareholder” and “stakeholder” 
capitalism, or (in the language of the “varieties of capitalism” literature – cf. Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
between “liberal” and “coordinated” market economies.
Corporate governance systems are largely associated with corresponding financial systems; 
Berglöf (1997) refers to the former as arm's length (outsider-dominated) and to the latter as con-
trol oriented (insider-dominated) financial systems. Anglo-American systems tend to have larger 
size and stronger role of equity markets and more dispersed ownership, which results in portfolio 
orientation of investors towards the control of enterprises and a stronger role of boards of directors 
(as opposed to control-orientation of dominant shareholders and relatively weaker boards which are 
more frequent in systems characterized by more concentrated ownership and stronger reliance on 
banks, rather than equity markets)2. Corporate governance cannot be reduced to the publicly traded 
companies or market-based modes, because that would severely limit its scope in bank-based fi-
nancial systems whereby the stock market plays an ancillary role in corporate finance, and takeover 
threats are rare due to concentrated ownership structures. The issues such as disclosure and transpar-
ency of corporate practices, and the treatment of minority shareholders and other stakeholders are 
particularly pertinent here. Inadequate regulation and/or ineffective judiciary, as it can be witnessed 
in many (post-)transition countries, further reinforce these problems. Therefore, reliance on arm's 
length modes is inadequate in the absence of markets for corporate control and a legal system that 
provides efficient redress mechanisms (Račić and Podrug, 2004).
Particular aspects of the corporate governance system – including modes of financing, level 
and types of coordination among stakeholders, corporate organization and industrial relations – can 
be used as arguments in support of institutional complementarity between the corporate governance 
system and the national innovation system. The development of one system does not presuppose 
the development of the other, but they tend to be mutually reinforcing. For example, Zimmermann 
(2004) argued that Germany (despite a developed corporate governance system) has not sufficiently 
developed its national innovation system – especially in the area of science-industry relationship 
and utilization of intellectual property rights. The combined effects of these factors may thus sig-
nificantly influence the innovative activities of companies operating under different governance 
regimes. The common view here is that Anglo-American systems are on average more conducive to 
radical innovation, due to stronger reliance on equity markets (and risk capital in particular), more 
2 See Tylecote and Conesa (2002) for a more detailed discussion.
Račić, D., Cvijanović, V., Aralica, Z.: The Effects of the Corporate...  Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXIX. (2008), No 1–2: 101–114 
104
flexible corporate organization and restructuring facilitated by flexible industrial relations. The basic 
claim is expressed by Allen and Gale (2000:406): “Markets will be especially effective at financing 
industries that are new or where relatively little relevant data is generated, that is, industries in which 
information is sparse and diversity of opinion persists.” Furthermore, Casper and Whitley (2002: 1) 
claim that, according to the “varieties of capitalism” framework, liberal market economies “excel 
in developing the necessary competencies to innovate in industries dominated by rapidly emerging 
technologies”. However, companies can also go public abroad, as in the case of Israeli companies 
doing initial public offerings in the USA. On the other hand, institutional frameworks in coordinated 
market economies tend to favor “long-term and incremental innovation strategies, but inhibit more 
radical innovation paths” (cf. Whitley, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Casper and Whitley's (2002) 
findings related to software and biotechnology firms in Germany, Sweden and the UK largely cor-
roborate these claims. However, the current debate about the relative merits of corporate governance 
systems regarding innovation cannot be automatically applied to transition economies. Although 
these countries usually have bank-based financial systems, their institutions are often both under-
developed and inconsistent, and capital markets may remain relatively shallow and illiquid (see the 
case of Croatia below).
At corporate level, corporate governance relationships and processes tend to influence innova-
tion and technology-related activities, such as R&D (cf. Lhuillery, 2006). The empirical literature 
tends to focus on the influence of ownership on R&D and the influence of governance practices 
on R&D. The evidence on the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D activity is 
inconclusive. As for the relationship between type of owners and R&D activity, Munari, Oriani and 
Sobrero (2005) found negative relations between the bank institutional investors and R&D activity, 
whereas Berrone, Surroca and Triba (2005) established a positive relationship between non-bank 
institutional investors and R&D activity. The influence of the composition of the board of directors 
on R&D is researched mainly through examination of the role of the non-executive directors, whose 
stronger presence on the board, according to Lhuillery (2006), is relatively more likely to promote 
innovation. As for the relationship between the governance practices and R&D expenditures, the 
results are also ambiguous. The CEO compensation scheme can stimulate corporate practice (Hall & 
Liebman, 1998), but no significant relation between the firm's compensation scheme for their man-
agers and R&D expenditure could be found in the literature (Eng & Shackell, 2001). The previous 
results suggest that corporate governance may influence R&D intensity, but it seems that the relation 
between corporate governance and R&D is context-dependent (on the relevance of R&D expendi-
ture within the corporation). When innovation is strongly embedded in corporate strategy, organi-
zational features and resource allocations, and supported by adequate governance arrangements, 
positive effects on R&D expenditures and innovation activities in general are quite likely. However, 
the relation between the corporate governance arrangements and the innovation activities is not uni-
directional: there is also feedback from innovation to corporate governance. Successful innovation 
requires collective learning processes that lead firms to undertake coordination of investments and 
further to achieve productive interactions (cf. Antonelli, 2003). Depending on the novelty of innova-
tions, sometimes a reorganization of a company is required (cf. Tylecote and Ramirez, 2005).
Furthermore, innovative capabilities of a company can often be facilitated by cooperative stake-
holder relationships, which correspond to strategic concerns and are supported by adequate incentives 
and governance arrangements. This includes innovation cooperation with research institutions, sup-
pliers, customers or other enterprises, as well as employee motivation through pecuniary (e.g. stock 
options, profit sharing, royalties etc.) and non-pecuniary means (e.g. organizational culture, learn-
ing opportunities etc.). Proactive relationships with seemingly more distant stakeholders may also 
increase innovative capabilities of a company – e.g. multisectoral partnerships between companies, 
public sector and nongovernmental organizations (cf. Bagić, Škrabalo and Narančić, 2004).
To sum up, the corporate governance system, complemented by the national innovation sys-
tem, influences innovation activities in a country. That is also likely to occur at the level of particular 
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companies. However, both relationships are still quite under-researched. Consequently, it is useful 
to provide case studies of particular countries which may assist in elaboration of more sophisticated 
findings on the issues. This is the aim of the following section, in which we examine the case of 
Croatia.
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION ACTIVITIES IN CROATIA
3.1. The system of corporate governance
The corporate governance regime in Croatia has emerged primarily through privatization and 
institution building: economic assets have been defined and distributed through privatization, which 
was complemented by as defining and enforcing legal and social frameworks that govern business 
transactions and firms engaged in them. However, the mismanagement of privatization and institu-
tion building (cf. Račić and Cvijanović, 2005) contributed to an underdeveloped capital market, high 
unemployment rate and insufficient technological and managerial upgrading of companies which 
results in their weak competitive position in the product/service markets. The “empty shell” (cf. 
Županov, 2001)3 model of privatization and defensive restructuring has led to widespread downsiz-
ing (sometimes through early retirement) and deindustrialization. The state still has control over a 
major share of the economy and provides rather sizable subsidies to companies it owns (cf. Račić 
and Cvijanović, 2005). Furthermore, institutional insufficiency (which was especially prevalent dur-
ing the 1990s, but to some extent continues to date) meant the lack, inconsistency or merely formal 
nature of institution building. Underdeveloped institutions have affected both the external and the 
internal incapacity of corporate governance mechanisms to steer business towards economically and 
socially viable goals and processes. Externally, weak legislation, ineffective judiciary and occasion-
al political influences led to the neglect of legal and social regulation, therefore increasing systemic 
risks and transaction costs. Within companies, the lack of independent external sources of authority 
that would facilitate best practices encouraged authoritarian tendencies in corporate governance and 
management. The lack of incentives to respect regulation and legitimize power by respecting princi-
ples considered just has made governance arrangements within companies into purely formal affairs 
(Račić and Cvijanović, 2005). On the other hand, only a small number of companies recognized the 
benefits of access to the capital market, including private equity providers.
Croatian financial system is similar to other (post-)transition economies; it is characterized 
by the domination of banks and a relatively shallow and illiquid capital market (Cvijanović, 2004). 
Banks own 77.6% of all financial assets of the financial sector (Rohatinski, 2006), although their 
share exceeded 90% only few years ago (Samodol, 2003). In addition, almost all investment funds, 
pension funds and leasing companies are also owned by banks, whose total assets have exceeded 
USD 49 billion. Although turnover and market capitalization of shares has constantly been rising 
since 1999, this was mainly because of regulatory reasons and positive impact of approaching the 
EU (Cvijanović, 2004; Zagreb Stock Exchange, 2004, 2005, 2006). The primary capital market has 
underperformed in terms of number of IPOs and bond issues; as such it has not played a strong role 
in the financing of companies.
When it comes to ownership structures, the analysis of basic data of public joint stock com-
panies4 in 2005 has shown that their ownership structures are highly concentrated. In 57% of the 
public joint stock companies 10 largest shareholders have more than 80% of the shares (Račić and 
Cvijanović, 2006). According to Hruška (2005), the largest owner of these companies has on av-
erage an ownership stake of 46.95%. Although this is not an exception in comparison with other 
3 Empty shell means that the firm exists as an economic subject, but there is no economically relevant 
function (like production, marketing, distribution) except for the existence of managerial contracts with ma-
nagers responsible (see Županov, 2001, p. 21).
4 They make the bulk of share trading at Zagreb Stock Exchange.
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countries of continental Europe, the problem arises in connection with independent functioning of 
the supervisory board. Membership of the supervisory board in Croatia is primarily connected with 
ownership function, rather than professional competence (Račić and Cvijanović, 2006). Besides, 
more concentrated ownership means fewer members of the supervisory board, i.e. stronger control 
by the dominant shareholders. Furthermore, an average supervisory board does not fulfill all the 
strategic functions that are within its area of responsibility (Hruška, 2005; Tipurić, 2006). Hence, the 
conclusion that “ownership and control of Croatian corporations are rarely completely separated” 
(Hruška, 2005:128) seems well founded. The latter is also correlated with inadequate protection of 
minority shareholders' rights and the lack of transparency in companies.
Consequently, the key challenges for further development of the corporate governance regime 
in Croatia include definition and promotion of good practices, protection of minority sharehold-
ers' rights, stronger role of supervisory boards, higher transparency of remuneration of manage-
ment board members and alignment of their compensation with the performance of the company, 
strengthening internal audit systems and promoting organizational cultures that facilitate transpar-
ency and sustainable value creation (cf. Račić and Cvijanović, 2006).
Competitiveness requires transparency and institutional credibility and stability which stimu-
late companies to focus on proactive long-term strategies of value creation based on investment, in-
novation and stakeholder engagement. Despite regulatory and capital market-related improvements 
in the last decade, the system of corporate governance is still relatively underdeveloped; as such it is 
insufficiently conducive to innovation.
3.2. Innovation strategies and performance
In this section we tackle the level and characteristics of main innovation activities and the posi-
tion of innovation within corporate strategies. The pilot Community Innovation Survey (cf. Račić et 
al., 2005) has shown that product and process innovations are relatively frequent in manufacturing 
enterprises (53.8%), which even exceeds the EU-15 average (47%). The level of innovativeness of 
the service sector (19.3%) is less than half of the EU-15 average (40%); this is particularly worry-
ing given that service sector is dominant in the Croatian economy. The innovation process brings 
along significant risks and expenditures, which can inhibit or slow down its progress. Innovation 
activities are often marginalized within corporate strategies or reduced to incremental modifications 
of existing products and/or processes. These findings have been confirmed by Aralica, Račić and 
Redžepagić (2007, p. 12) who researched knowledge transfer in Croatian manufacturing enterprises 
that have received foreign direct investments. They found that knowledge- and innovation-related 
activities (e.g. basic and applied research, product development and process engineering) are usually 
undertaken outside of the Croatian subsidiaries. It should be noted that foreign ownership is associ-
ated with above-average innovativeness (Račić et al., 2005).
Following OECD's (2005) dual classification of innovations into incremental or radical, we 
observe that 12.2% of the firms have introduced radical innovations. Such innovations tend to be 
linked with the company's orientation to the national market: 75% of radical innovators claim that the 
national market for them is more important than international markets. Therefore, very few radical 
innovators are internationally competitive; moreover, innovations considered radical in Croatia have 
often already been introduced elsewhere. Correspondingly, a high share of innovators in Croatia do 
not undertake research and development at all (33.8% in the manufacturing sector and 20.8% in the 
service sector), and enterprises that invest in research and development have generally a low level of 
research and development intensity5. Moreover, Aralica, Račić and Radić (2005) found no statistical 
5 The overall level of R&D expenditures in the business sector (0.52% of GDP in 2004) is also low, 
although Croatia performs better than several new EU member states. Low technology and medium low tech-
nology industries account for almost 3/4 of the value added (74.1%) in manufacturing (Aralica, 2007). These 
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interdependence between R&D activities and the innovation propensity of Croatian companies. The 
capability to make additional revenues from innovation is weak and the economic effects of innova-
tions (e.g. the share of revenues from new products in total revenues) are thus limited.
Inadequate economic effects point to the lack of resources and/or capabilities for innovation. A 
complementary explanation may also include structures of markets where firms operate. For exam-
ple, markedly low levels of innovation in service sectors may be at least partly attributed to market 
concentration in those sectors, which are due to non-tradable nature of services and slow liberaliza-
tion. Among the obstacles to innovation, high innovation expenditures and insufficient state support 
and the lack of the appropriate sources of finance are emphasized most frequently. The complexity 
of innovative activities, which result in high risks and costs, should stimulate sharing of potential 
risks and rewards. However, the cooperation among the Croatian enterprises in the innovation devel-
opment is rather weak. 66% of product innovations and 57% of process innovations are developed 
within the enterprise or within the group of enterprises. Only 2.0% of innovative enterprises are 
cooperating with other enterprises and institutions in the innovation development. In EU-15 19% of 
enterprises develop innovations in cooperation. A comparison with other countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, which shows considerable lags, is given in Figure 1.














Source: EUROSTAT/Račić et. al. (2005)
The most frequent form of innovation cooperation involves suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components or software (manufacturing enterprises 10%, service enterprises 3.1%). The collabora-
tion with academic institutions occupies the second place in manufacturing (6.2%) and the third 
place in service sectors (2.1%). Despite occasional positive examples, science-industry collabora-
tion is still rather underdeveloped (cf. Radas, 2004; Radas and Vehovec, 2006).
Despite marginalization of innovation within corporate strategies, their low economic effects 
and insufficient resources and capabilities as the main obstacles to innovation, it has been observed 
industries are mostly based on relatively stable technologies, unlike in the medium high technology and high 
technology sectors (cf. OECD, 1997), which produce products using advanced and fast changing technologies 
that are usually accompanied by R&D investments. Consequently, companies in these sectors build their 
competitive position frequently by a product and/or process innovations (cf. Lall, 2001).
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that enterprises rarely engage in innovation cooperation. Consequently, the industrial structure is 
characterized by underdeveloped strategic alliances, clusters and industrial networks. This issue is 
related to both strategy and corporate governance, whereby the lack of cooperative stakeholder rela-
tionships becomes a hindrance to risk sharing that would facilitate more radical innovation projects 
with higher value added. A possible solution to these problems may involve external investments ac-
companied by technological and managerial improvements, which is the topic of the next section.
3.3. Corporate governance and external financing of innovation
Improvements in corporate governance are often prerequisites and/or consequences of receiv-
ing external finance, because of transparency and reporting requirements and control mechanisms 
required by the providers of financial resources. Although debt may also entail strong commitments 
and induce governance improvements (especially in the case of debt securities) on the part of its 
issuer, our main focus will be on equity, given its higher risk and stronger monitoring prerogatives 
it implies. The pilot Community Innovation Survey (Račić et al., 2005) has shown that innovations 
in Croatian enterprises are mainly financed from their own resources (79.2%), followed by bank 
loans (8.5%) and supplier credits (9.6%), which implicates a strong connection of present innovation 
processes with the equipment procurement, but also points to the economic restrictions of a more 
important level of innovation activities in Croatian enterprises. Government subsidies to innovation 
activities are rather rare and are focused on manufacturing and smaller and medium size enterprises. 
When discussing the effects of external finance on innovative activities in companies, it is useful 
to distinguish two main beneficiaries of financial inflows – both of which are related to raising cor-
porate governance standards in companies. The first group comprises existing companies that have 
attracted – usually foreign – capital (often in the course of privatization) and undergone restructuring 
that includes product and process innovations. A wider definition of this group would also comprise 
greenfield FDI projects, which are expected to have adequate governance mechanisms from their es-
tablishment. The second group consists of emerging innovative SMEs that require additional capital 
to finance their start up and expansion. However, seed and start-up capital are rather rare in Croatia. 
At the end of the section, we tackle the issue of venture capital – as a mode that is particularly suit-
able for innovation financing of smaller firms with growth potential. Namely, due to the intangibility 
of their assets, “smaller firms pursuing innovation strategies may face greater difficulty in obtaining 
debt finance for start-up and the early stages of development than their conventional counterparts” 
(Brierley, 2001:66).
As for the established companies, innovation in Croatian enterprises is related to the concern 
affiliation (62% enterprises belonging to the concern are innovative and 42.7% not belonging to 
the concern), which reflects positively on the transfer of innovations through the existing business 
groups (cf. Račić et al., 2005). Higher innovativeness of enterprises with the foreign capital share is 
related to this issue. Namely 59.7% of enterprises with a share of capital of foreign origin innovate, 
in comparison with 33.5% innovators among enterprises that have not received any foreign invest-
ments (Račić et al., 2005). Inflow of foreign capital usually brings about more effective governance 
and contributes to improvement of products and processes, but it is likely that that most of these 
product and process innovations already exist within the international concern or a business group. 
Since privatization takeovers, as the most significant form of foreign direct investment, were until 
recently focused on conquering the domestic market, it was not possible to expect strong contribu-
tion to radical innovations and export competitiveness. A peculiarity of FDI inflows into Croatia is 
that almost 50 percent of the total FDI has gone into the services sectors, such as transportation and 
telecommunications and financial intermediation (cf. Bačić, Račić and Ahec-Šonje, 2004); given 
the non-tradable nature of most such services, it can be concluded that the investors have been 
motivated by market-seeking reasons. This is linked to seeking strategic control over the domestic 
companies through acquisitions of majority or controlling stakes, which enables alleviation of the 
aforementioned governance problems (see above), easier restructuring and reaping of the corre-
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sponding returns on investment. On the other hand, corporate strategies are characterized by weak 
linkages with SMEs and with academic institutions; their restructuring rarely involves spin-offs that 
can be attractive to private equity investors, or acquisitions of SMEs that have grown on their own 
or have been nurtured by venture capital companies. There is only one significant corporate ventur-
ing vehicle – a private equity fund of EUR 35 million founded by nine Croatian corporate investors 
(Quaestus Private Equity Partners).
A comparison between the industrial structures of developed and Central and East European 
economies reveals that in (post-)transition economies SMEs play a comparatively smaller role in 
corporate production networks, and are characterized by lower levels of innovation (Iliev and Račić, 
2004). In Croatia, the occurrence of innovations is related to the size of an enterprise: 35% of 
small firms, 50.4% of medium size firms and 60.6% of large firms innovate. Although this can be 
explained by more resources and very pronounced specialization of employees in larger firms, an 
alternative interpretation emphasizes the insufficient contribution of small and medium enterprises 
to innovation activities, lower level of inventiveness of new products and services and thereto re-
lated lower level of economic effects of innovation (Račić et al., 2005). The lack of inventiveness 
entails imitation of products of established strategies and production programs of existing compa-
nies, rather than offering novelties on the market. As for the lack of innovative SMEs, it is related 
to underdevelopment of the science-industry collaboration in general and of technology transfer and 
academic entrepreneurship in particular – in terms of incentive systems and financial (subsidies, 
debt and equity sources) and organizational resources that would facilitate new technology based 
firms to go through seed and start up stages. When it comes to existing innovative SMEs, their pros-
perity and growth may be limited by the entrepreneurs' strategy to preserve maximal degree of stra-
tegic control and avoid accountability obligations external finance brings (cf. McMahon, 2000). In a 
recently undertaken research one can see that most of high growth export-oriented SMEs are owned 
by a single entrepreneur (or groups of entrepreneurs) who have recognized a business opportunity. 
Such enterprises tend to be managed in the style of enlightened paternalism. This is understandable, 
given the prevailing cultural norms and entrepreneurial climate during the transition period, but it is 
questionable whether such ownership structures and management approach are suited for future en-
terprise development. If the aspiration to preserve maximal control over the enterprise prevails over 
optimal growth strategies, that can result in obstacles to collaboration within clusters or industrial 
networks, as well as to restructuring and mergers/acquisitions of companies, with reduced interest 
on the part of external investors (Račić, Aralica and Redžepagić, 2006).
Although enterprises list market reasons as key impediments to innovation, seen mainly through 
high costs and lack of adequate financing sources (cf. Račić et al., 2005), Young and Cvijanović 
(2006) found that supply of venture capital funds, as an inherent innovation financing source, ex-
ceeds demand, which implies lack of a qualified demand, due to the predominance of debt financing 
and the corresponding lack of equity financing culture among Croatian entrepreneurs. Venture capi-
tal industry in Croatia is currently valued around 100 million USD. There have not been any initial 
public offerings initiated by venture capital or private equity companies; few exits that have been 
made occurred through trade sales (sales of portfolio companies to a corporation) or buybacks. Iliev 
and Račić (2004) identified several constraints on the deal flow (investment proposals that are made 
to venture capital companies) in the Central and Eastern Europe that are also applicable here. Some 
impediments are related to the rare emergence of SMEs with innovative products and/or significant 
growth potential that could be nurtured by venture capital involvement (exhaustion of the privatiza-
tion pool, weak linkages with academic institutions, limited number and quality of corporate spin-
offs). Others occur due to the lack of available financial and managerial resources necessary for 
SME creation and growth and stimulating venture capital interest and involvement. These include 
the lack of business angels and referral networks and experienced senior venture capital managers, 
as well as the aforementioned caution towards equity investments. The innovation policy should 
thus incorporate measures to address these concerns.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The level and characteristics of innovation activities within an economy depend upon both 
market and wider institutional determinants. We have thus attempted to analyze the relationship 
between the system of corporate governance and innovation activities, using the example of Croatia. 
There is a need for further research on systems of corporate governance, corporate strategies and 
innovation activities in (post-)transition economies, as well as on the policies that may positively 
affect institutional development and economic performance.
Institutional frameworks that constitute the system of corporate governance have an impact on 
the level and prevalent modes of innovation activities and ways in which innovations are developed, 
financed and implemented within enterprises. Hereby one can observe strong complementarities 
between the system of corporate governance, financial system and national innovation system. De-
spite emerging initiatives towards international standards and the harmonization pressures induced 
by globalization, a variety of national systems of corporate governance many differences are likely 
to be preserved, including the basic division between Anglo-American and continental European 
and East Asian governance systems. Particular aspects of the corporate governance system – includ-
ing modes of financing, level and types of coordination among stakeholders, corporate organization 
and industrial relations are also useful for understanding the innovation activities and the national 
innovation system. The current debate about the relative merits of corporate governance systems 
regarding innovation cannot be automatically applied to (post-)transition economies. Their bank-
based financial systems are often characterized by underdeveloped and/or inconsistent institutions, 
whereas their capital markets may suffer from being shallow and illiquid.
This has been the case in Croatia, whereby underdeveloped institutions have affected both 
the external and the internal incapacity of corporate governance mechanisms. The aforementioned 
factors both external to companies (like weak legislation, ineffective judiciary and occasional po-
litical influences coupled with underdeveloped markets) and within companies (authoritarian man-
agement tendencies on a fertile ground of a formal nature of corporate governance arrangements) 
have negatively influenced the quantity and impact of innovation activities. Despite regulatory and 
capital market-related improvements, the system of corporate governance is still insufficiently con-
ducive to innovation and, more generally, to corporate strategies based on investment, innovation 
and stakeholder engagement. In other words, there is a misalignment between the corporate govern-
ance system and innovative activities that characterize the emerging knowledge-based economy: the 
current conditions are conducive primarily to non-complex innovation activities. Enterprises with 
more ambitious business strategies based on innovation and higher governance and competitiveness 
standards may be burdened by higher risks and costs. This is reflected in the marginalization of in-
novation within corporate strategies, which lead to their low economic effects. Despite insufficient 
resources and capabilities as the main obstacles to innovation, innovation cooperation is low – even 
in comparison with (post-)transition economies that the have joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The 
lack of cooperative stakeholder relationships precludes risk sharing that could facilitate innovation 
projects with higher value added. This can at least in part be addressed by external investments ac-
companied by technological and managerial improvements. This may involve domestic and foreign 
direct investments into greenfield projects, established companies, including the innovative SMEs 
with a growth potential. The latter could be particularly effectively served by venture capital, whose 
involvement is limited by a limited deal flow. The lack of innovative SMEs is related to underdevel-
opment of the science-industry collaboration in general and technology transfer and academic entre-
preneurship in particular – in terms of incentive systems and financial and organizational resources 
that would facilitate new technology based firms to go through seed and start up stages. The prosper-
ity and growth of existing innovative SMEs may be limited by the entrepreneurs' strategy to preserve 
maximal degree of strategic control and avoid accountability obligations external finance brings.
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Članak obrađuje implikacije sustava korporativnog upravljanja na razi-
nu i prevladavajuće forme inovacijskih aktivnosti te na načine razvoja, finan-
ciranja i primjene inovacija u poduzećima. Cilj članka je doprinijeti raspravi 
o korporativnom upravljanju i inovacijama kroz objašnjavanje odnosa između 
institucionalnih uvjeta, poslovnih strategija vezanih uz inovacije i inovacijskih 
aktivnosti. Pritom se koristi primjer Hrvatske, kao (post-)tranzicijske zemlje 
s osobitom razvojnom putanjom. Međutim aktualna rasprava o učincima te-
meljnih sustava korporativnog upravljanja (Anglo-američkog i kontinental-
nog europskog) na inovacijske aktivnosti ne može se adekvatno primijeniti na 
(post-)tranzicijske zemlje. Unatoč unapređenjima regulative i tržišta kapitala 
tijekom posljednjeg desetljeća, u Hrvatskoj je sustav korporativnog upravlja-
nja još uvijek relativno nerazvijen i nedovoljno poticajan za inovacije. Učinko-
vitost nacionalnog inovacijskog sustava odražava se u složenosti inovacijskih 
aktivnosti u poduzećima, kao i u njihovim učincima na konkurentnost podu-
zeća i ekonomskih sektora. Sustav korporativnog upravljanja također trenut-
no ne pruža adekvatne poticaje razvoju ekonomije utemeljene na znanju, jer 
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potiče inovacijske aktivnosti manje razine složenosti. To se odražava u mar-
ginalnoj ulozi inovacija u poslovnoj strategiji, i njihovim niskim ekonomskim 
učincima. Nepostojanje suradničkih odnosa interesno-utjecajnih skupina 
sprečava podjelu rizika koja bi omogućila realizaciju inovacijskih projekata s 
većom dodanom vrijednošću. Ovaj problem se dijelom može riješiti vanjskim 
ulaganjima (povezanima s tehnološkim i upravljačkim unapređenjima) u nove 
projekte i postojeća poduzeća – napose u mala i srednja poduzeća s velikim 
potencijalom rasta.
Ključne riječi: KORPORATIVNO UPRAVLJANJE, INSTITUCIJE, NA-
CIONALNI INOVACIJSKI SUSTAV, INOVACIJSKE AKTIVNOSTI, HRVAT-
SKA
